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Summary for Policy Makers 
The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere else on Earth; satellite observations have revealed 
the region is losing sea ice at a dramatic rate and this decline is expected to continue. This loss 
of sea ice is creating opportunities for shorter global trade links between East Asia and the UK 
via the Arctic. The Northern Sea Route and North West Passages are seasonally open most 
years, although specialised vessels are currently required. The Arctic shipping season will 
continue to extend tripling in length by mid-century, coinciding with the opening of the trans-
polar sea route across the central Arctic Ocean, although there will still be sea ice present in the 
Arctic winter. Typically by mid-century voyages from East Asia to the UK could save 10 – 12 
days by using trans-Arctic routes instead of the Suez Canal route. These findings suggest that 
trans-Arctic routes may provide a useful supplement to the traditional canal routes, but they will 
likely not replace them.  
There are mixed views on whether trans-Arctic routes will become economically viable. The 
Russian government wishes to develop the Northern Sea Route as a commercial enterprise and 
offers substantial fee-based services such as ice breaking support and pilotage, which are 
certainly necessary for future investment and development of the route. However Arctic 
transport is also likely to grow due to increased destination shipping to serve natural resource 
extraction projects and cruise tourism. 
The UK is well positioned, geographically, geopolitically, and commercially, to benefit from a 
symbiotic relationship with increasing Arctic shipping. The UK has a prominent role in Arctic 
science and a world leading maritime services industry based in London, including the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), one of the world’s leading financial centres, and 
Europe’s largest insurance sector. Arctic economic growth is focused in four key sectors — 
mineral resources, fisheries, logistics, and tourism — all of which require shipping, and could 
generate investment reaching $100bn or more in the Arctic region over the next decade. The 
UK had a fundamental role in preparing the UN IMO Polar Code which came into operation in 
January 2017. The Polar Code is an historic milestone in addressing the specific risks faced by 
Arctic shipping and acts to supplement the existing SOLAS and MARPOL conventions for 
protecting the environment whilst ensuring safe shipping in international waters. 
Much of the investment into Arctic shipping projects is from China but northern European 
countries are also playing an increasing role. Potential opportunities for the UK include the 
development of UK based Arctic cruise tourism, and a UK based trans-shipment port — 
transferring goods from ice-classed vessels to conventional carriers. The UK has an active 
diplomatic role in many international organisations; this should be used to ensure that increased 
activity in the Arctic is accomplished in line with established UN maritime conventions, many of 
which were written with significant UK contributions. The UK’s leading role in Arctic science has 
wide reaching positive implications for international collaboration; this role requires continued 
investment into climate modelling centres, and science programs, that are essential to enhance 
predictions of the future Arctic.  
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Figure 1. Infographic summarising House of Lords (2015) “Responding to a Changing Arctic”.  
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Introduction 
The UK’s Arctic policy as set out in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s — 2013 Arctic 
Policy Framework, recognises the underpinning role of science in directly contributing to 
diplomacy, policy and our understanding of the Arctic. This review examines the future of 
shipping through the Arctic Ocean with implications for UK Arctic policy and beyond. The latest 
scientific and economic research is referenced, along with views from leading UK and 
international experts from a variety of disciplines.  
Figure 2 illustrates the connectedness of Northern European Ports to the rest of the world with 
Europe to East Asian trade comprising almost a third of the world’s container traffic. The 
geographically shortest route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans is through the Arctic; 
however sea ice provides a formidable deterrent for all but the hardiest ships. Over the last four 
decades satellites have observed a rapid melting of Arctic sea ice and climate models 
unanimously project that this decline will continue throughout the 21st century, giving rise to the 
possibility of commercial trans-Arctic shipping in the near future. 
 
Figure 2. Inter-continental container shipping, 2011, taken from Humpert (2013).  
This report presents the evidence for, and implications of, the opening of the Arctic sea routes, 
that are relevant to UK policy makers. The report addresses three related themes: 
1. Evolution of Arctic Shipping Routes in the 21st Century 
2. Commercial Viability of Arctic Routes 
3. Potential Impacts of Open Arctic Routes on the UK’s Maritime Interests 
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1. Evolution of Arctic Shipping Routes in the 
21st Century 
This section uses multiple climate model simulations to assess Arctic changes for two future 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission scenarios: a low emission scenario in line with the UN 
‘Paris’ climate deal aiming to keep global mean temperature rise below 2˚C, and a ‘Business as 
Usual’ (BaU) scenario where global greenhouse gas concentrations increase unabated. 
However, the future climate and hence Arctic shipping conditions may fall in between. These 
future scenarios and the range of simulated future changes to Arctic sea ice are summarised in 
Figure 3, adapted from the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report 
(Collins et al. 2013). 
The Arctic is extremely sensitive to climate change and is responding faster than anywhere else 
on the planet. Since satellite observations of Arctic sea ice began in the late 1970s, the Arctic 
has, on average, lost 3000 km3/decade of sea ice. This rate is faster than the average depicted 
from climate model simulations from the same period, fuelling debate about whether this higher 
loss rate will continue or is due to temporary climatic fluctuations.  
All climate models include representations of the Arctic, with permafrost and ice sheets over 
land areas and a sea ice component that floats on the ocean, moves with the winds and 
currents, and melts and re-freezes throughout the year. Regional climate, including in the Arctic, 
is always strongly coupled to global scale changes and therefore, despite known weaknesses in 
current models, that include coarse representations of Arctic islands and straits, these models 
are still the most reliable tools we have for making future projections.  
Today the majority of journeys from East Asia to Europe sail via the Suez Canal while voyages 
to the US Atlantic Coast sail via the Panama Canal. However, voyages from East Asia to 
Europe through the Arctic are typically 40% shorter in distance — potentially reducing journey 
times, saving fuel and costs. This is one reason why major shipping nations such as China, 
Japan, Singapore, and South Korea sought and gained observer status to the Arctic Council in 
May 2013, despite their lack of Arctic Circle territory. This section will use climate models to 
assess changes to the Arctic sea ice, the biggest physical barrier to Arctic shipping, to reveal 
the climatic potential for Arctic shipping; whether these new routes are likely to be used is 
discussed in Section 2.  
 Implications from Opening of Arctic Sea Routes 
8 
 
 
Figure 3. Changes in February and September multi-model mean Arctic sea ice concentration 
from climate models for a ‘business as usual’ (BAU) emissions scenario. The pink contour 
represents satellite observed sea ice extent 1986 – 2005 (15% sea ice concentration). Adapted 
from IPCC AR5 Figure 12.29 (Collins et al. 2013). 
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1.1 Recent Navigability on Arctic Routes 
Trans-Arctic voyages are currently focused on two main routes (Figure 4): the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR) – along Russia’s northern coast – predominantly for journeys between Europe and 
Asia, and the North West Passage (NWP) through the Canadian Archipelago, as a route from 
the US east coast to Asia. The fastest (direct) European route would be the Transpolar Sea 
Route (TSR) straight over the North Pole (Figure 4 grey route). 
Recent transit statistics for the NSR and NWP (Arctic Logistics Information Office 2015; 
Canadian Coast Guard 2015) are also shown in Figure 4; the statistics show an overall increase 
in trans-Arctic voyages. Shipping experts agree that these (few) voyages are exploratory in 
nature, ‘testing the water’ to see if Arctic routes are economically viable.  
 
Figure 4. Fastest September trans-Arctic routes and recent 
transit statistics. 
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1.2 Potential for Increase in Trans-Arctic Shipping  
Simulations of future climate assume different anthropogenic scenarios for the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases (primarily CO2) in the atmosphere. Here results from a low CO2 scenario, 
that aims to keep global mean temperature rise below 2˚C, in line with the ‘Paris’ Climate 
agreements (Hulme 2016), and a high ‘Business as Usual (BaU)’ CO2 scenario are presented. 
Climate models unanimously project1 that Arctic Sea ice will continue in long term decline 
beyond the middle of this century, regardless of the most optimistic mitigation strategies. 
However predicting when trans-Arctic routes will become available is complicated due to highly 
variable sea ice distributions. For example, the very low sea ice extent in 2007 did not exhibit 
open trans-Arctic routes due to a key strait remaining blocked with ice.  
Results here are based on a recent study by Melia et al. (2016) using several different climate 
models, each constrained by recent sea ice observations. This allows projections from multiple 
models to be more meaningfully combined to estimate uncertainty in future amounts of sea ice. 
Figure 5 shows the fastest trans-Arctic sea routes, when available, to both Open Water (OW) 
vessels (blue) and Ice strengthened (Polar Class 6) vessels (pink) during September (the most 
ice free month), in all these future climate model simulations.    
Projections for the next couple of decades (Figure 5a, b) are similar for both scenarios, with 
relatively few tracks for OW vessels (30 - 40% of Septembers available) and all confined to the 
NSR and NWP. In contrast, ice-strengthened PC6 ships (capable in <1.5m thick ice) might find 
some variant of the TSR open during most (~90%) Septembers. Using these routes OW and 
PC6 vessels would make a passage from North Sea ports to Yokohama in around 20 and 18 
days respectively. Via Suez these journeys would take at least 30 days, not including delays 
required to navigate the canal.  
The mid-century routes (Figure 5c, d) are quite different for the Paris and BaU CO2 scenarios. 
For the Paris scenario OW vessels can now sail trans-Arctic in 59% of Septembers, still relying 
on variations of the NSR, although they can often avoid the Sannikov and Vilkitsky Straits 
(Figure 4) which have draft restrictions. For a BaU scenario OW vessels can cross in 82% of 
Septembers with the TSR now often open, indicating that the central Arctic sea ice sometimes 
disappears entirely saving an additional 1-2 days travel time. PC6 ships can always sail the 
fastest TSR routes (100%). 
 
                                            
 
1 The word ‘projection’ is normally used for simulations of future climate to denote that the model predictions are 
contingent on the assumed pathway of greenhouse gas concentrations. 
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Figure 5. Fastest available September trans-Arctic routes from calibrated future climate 
simulations for Paris style scenario (a, c) and a BaU world (b, d). Cyan lines represent open water 
(OW) vessels, and pink lines represent Polar Class 6 vessels (PC6, capable of navigating in sea 
ice 1.2 m thick); line weights indicate the number of transits using the same route, percentages 
are the probability that Arctic routes are open for the respective vessel class.  
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1.3 Season Length Changes 
Transit conditions always remain optimal around September, but future commercial shipping 
would likely require a much longer shipping season. Figure 6 shows the probability that any 
trans-arctic route would be available to open water vessels through different months, based on 
our multiple climate model results. The widening of the shaded regions indicates that the 
shipping season will extend, becoming approximately a month longer every decade. By mid-
century for a Paris scenario the number of navigable days per season is on average 2.5 times 
greater than early-century; for a BaU scenario — 3.5 times greater. The BaU scenario therefore 
has 40% more navigable days than Paris by mid-century. By late century the majority of the 
Arctic Ocean is expected to be open water for half the year in a BaU world (also e.g. Barnhart et 
al. (2016); Laliberté et al. (2016)); however, during the transition high ice years will still occur 
(e.g. Notz (2015); Swart et al. (2015)). Although year round transits should be possible with ice-
strengthened ships, the models suggest that OW transits will remain seasonal.  
 
Figure 6. Probability of open trans-Arctic routes through the year for low and high future 
greenhouse gas scenarios. Early century (2015 – 2030); Mid-century (2045 – 2060); Late-century 
(2075 – 2090) 
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2. Commercial Viability of Arctic Routes   
Shipping in the Arctic can be broken down into two categories: ‘trans-Arctic’ shipping, as a short 
cut between Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and ‘destination’ shipping, to and from destinations 
within the Arctic. Although trans-Arctic shipping has increased since 2007 (Figure 4), the peak 
in destination shipping occurred under the Soviet Union, before the effects of climate change 
drastically affected the Arctic sea ice pack on the scale seen in the last 20 years. This Soviet 
peak in shipping was supported with huge investments in icebreakers, ports, and infrastructure 
along the eastern Arctic coast.  
2.1 Incentives and Challenges  
Trans-Arctic routes are shorter and may lead to savings in travel time and fuel, and hence 
potential economic savings, however it currently requires specialist knowledge and flexibility not 
suited to some markets, for example container shipping which operates on strict schedules and 
a network of cargo exchange at ports en route. This is opposed to bulk shipping (carrying 
unpackaged cargo such as grains, oil, LNG, ore etc. in its cargo holds) which generally has 
operate on more flexible schedules.  
Incentives for destination shipping include the development of natural resources spurred by 
global commodity prices, resupply to remote Arctic communities, fishing, research voyages, and 
marine tourism. Whilst climate change will increasingly open up Arctic shipping routes, the 
opposite is true for Arctic land surface transport. Here accessibility is likely to decrease due to 
warmer winters resulting in lost potential for winter road construction, melting permafrost, and 
deeper snow accumulations (Stephenson et al. 2011), perhaps leading to increased reliance on 
maritime transport links.  
The major impediment to Arctic shipping is operating in the freezing and remote Arctic 
environment which requires experienced Arctic crews, specialist equipment, and vessels. The 
world’s leading mutual insurer — UK P&I Club considers these additional risks and underwrites 
accordingly. The additional risks outlined by UK P&I Club (2014) are: 
1. Physical risks to the ship and crew from, extreme weather, cold, and ice conditions. Contact 
with ice floes and icebergs, ice accretion, restricted visibility and operational malfunctions 
due to cold. All can potentially contribute to cause delays and damage to the ship, her crew 
and cargo. 
2. Lack of infrastructure compounding these physical risks, including: poor communications, 
incomplete charting in some areas, unreliable navigational aids, and potential remoteness 
from all sources of help when an incident happens, including remoteness from salvage and 
clean-up facilities, Search & Rescue (SAR), medical assistance, surveyors, and bunkering 
facilities. 
3. Enhanced human element risks if the officers and crew lack the training and experience to 
address the difficulties noted above. 
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Autonomous systems are likely to become increasingly important to the maritime industry in 
combatting these risks; the majority (~80%) of accidents are attributed to human errors (DNV 
GL 2015).   
2.2 Economic Viability of Commercial Trans-Arctic Shipping 
Studies into the economic feasibility of 21st century trans-Arctic shipping date back as early as 
Wergeland (1992), a year after the NSR became open to international traffic and just after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Lasserre (2014) compiled a comprehensive review of 26 such 
studies and finds that 13 conclude that Arctic routes can be profitable for commercial shipping, 
six are ambivalent or do not take a position, and seven conclude that conditions are currently 
too difficult to be profitable. This conflict in the literature continues, for example Bensassi et al. 
(2016) predict increases in trans-Arctic shipping during the 21st century to be minimal, while 
Bekkers et al. (2016) predict a shift of shipping traffic from Suez to Arctic routes.  
The Russian NSR administration’s advertised tariffs for transit along the NSR (Northern Sea 
Route Administration 2013), would make any routine use prohibitively expensive. However, 
Lasserre (2014) note that the Finnish shipping company Tschudi find these rates are negotiable 
so as to attract future business. The NSR administration details a list of requirements, and 
charges to operate on the NSR (Arctic Logistics Information Office, 2015). To transit the NSR, a 
ship operator must apply for a permit between 15 – 120 days in advance of the estimated arrival 
in the NSR water area whereas the NWP currently has no fee system and the Canadian 
government will most likely not introduce fees, as it would discourage the economic viability of 
the route. However, insurance premiums vary widely; they are currently higher for the NWP 
than the NSR. The NSR is currently the most attractive of the three major route choices 
because of the favourable ice conditions and Russia plays a powerful role in controlling the 
waters of the NSR. With future reductions in Arctic sea ice, the TSR via the central Arctic Ocean 
may become a more attractive prospect. 
Lasserre (2014) concludes that ultimately the profitability of transits depends on destination, 
with north-east Asian ports like Yokohama (Japan) being more profitable than more southerly 
Asian ports like Shanghai (China) due to the smaller distance savings. Transit time is noted as 
the most important factor determining profitability, rather than fuel cost, as faster journeys allow 
a higher frequency of voyages.  
2.3 Commercial Traffic Types & Destinations  
The vast majority of current shipping in Arctic waters is local or destination shipping. Ships 
automatically send their navigational information to tracking satellites and these data were used 
by Eguíluz et al. (2016) to find a total of 11,066 ships in Arctic waters in 2014, 9.3% of the 
world’s shipping traffic. The majority of these ships were in the “specialist” category (e.g., 
supply, research, and survey vessels), followed by fishing (1,960), cargo (1,892), tanker (524), 
and passenger (308) vessels (Figure 7). The vast majority (2,000 vessels per month) were in 
the North Atlantic (Barents Sea) region, the closest Arctic sea area to U.K. waters and where 
sea ice is least common. It is in this strategic area of interest that the UK Royal Navy may be 
asked to increase its presence, along with other NATO allies (Depledge 2014).  
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Figure 7. Monthly average number of ships per 1000 km2 adapted from Eguíluz et al. (2016). 
The three shipping sectors most likely to increase in Arctic waters are: (i) destination shipping is 
likely to grow in-line with increased natural resource extraction in the region (AMSA 2009) (also 
see Section 3.5.2); (ii) regular trans-Arctic shipping, will require a reliable extension to the Arctic 
shipping season due to ice melt, along with the required commercial drivers (Section 2.5). (iii) 
‘cruise tourism’ is likely to increase, a sector where the UK could become a direct provider 
(Lloyd's Register 2015), and recent voyages like that of the Crystal Serenity in 2016 (Laursen 
2016; Snider 2016) prove that the commercial demand and technical knowledge is available 
(Section 2.4).  
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2.4 Route Dependent Opportunities 
The physical opportunities presented in Section 1 suggest that conditions along the NSR will be 
most favourable, with similar conditions on the NWP and the TSR around 10 and 30 years later 
respectively.  
Table 1. Current Arctic shipping activities within the Arctic Council coastal states’ EEZa. Adapted 
from Lloyd's Register (2015). 
Shipping Type Within EEZa of Arctic Council coastal state 
Canada Greenland Russia US Norway / 
Iceland 
Destination 
Shipping 
Passenger Cruise Ships ✔ ✔  ✔  
Export of Natural resources ✔  ✔   
Local re-supply ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Fishing ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Patrol / SAR ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Transit 
Shipping 
Northern Sea Route (NSR)   ✔  ✔ 
North West Passage (NWP) ✔   ✔ ✔ 
Transpolar Sea Route (TSR)b ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
a EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone – typically 200 nautical miles from the shoreline) dependant 
on UNCLOS extended continental shelf claims. 
b Not currently used, actual route of Trans-Arctic crossing may pass through Canada, 
Greenland, Russia, US, Norway and/or Iceland waters or international waters. 
In the near term the NSR is the most popular route due to location, favourable ice conditions, 
and ice-breaker support from the Russian NSR Administration. From mid-century availability of 
the faster TSR would avoid the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and thus fees. Ice 
breaker tariffs may change when ice free conditions on the NSR prevail for longer and if the 
TSR does become more viable, because Russia wishes to encourage regular use of the NSR 
(Soroka 2017). 
On the NWP Canada currently offers no chartered ice-breaking support but they provide 
guidance, ice and meteorological forecasts, and SAR coverage. Although the route here is more 
technically challenging the remoteness and pristineness of the Canadian Archipelago and 
Greenland make the area attractive to cruise tourism as seen by the recent cruise by the Crystal 
Serenity (Laursen 2016; Snider 2016); which involved meticulous planning and consultancy with 
experts to manage the considerable risk potential. 
2.5 Required Commercial Changes  
For trans-Arctic shipping to be commercially viable and accommodate the higher volumes seen 
on established shipping routes would require most of the following: additional en route ports and 
infrastructure, ice breaking services, polar class vessels with experienced crew, SAR 
coverage/agreements, a globally high bunker fuel price, continued growth in Arctic exports, and 
availability of insurance underwriting. The recently ratified UN International Maritime 
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Organisation Polar Code (International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2015) that outlines the 
safety requirements unique to sailing in Arctic waters is also a necessary first step (Section 3.4). 
For some cargo, the dominant economic factor is the price of bunker fuel. In 2016 the price 
dropped so far that some shipping operators shunned the Suez Canal route (and the associated 
transit costs) and voyaged via the Cape of Good Hope. The price of bunker fuel would need to 
increase so that the fuel savings from Arctic routes became more significant. Because of the 
continued presence of winter ice throughout the 21st century, shipping companies would have to 
adjust to a dual route model, using Arctic routes when possible and traditional routes when not. 
Alternatively, investments in ice class cargo ships like the PC6 and new technologies like dual 
acting ships would potentially enable year round trans-Arctic shipping. A renewing of the 
icebreaker fleet to maintain the routes and ports would also be required in the short to medium 
term when higher ice years remain more frequent.  
In addition to the above, the Arctic needs investment for the development of infrastructure 
projects and logistical hubs as most of the region is underserved by transportation, port and 
other critical infrastructure. Increasing the Arctic’s appeal for investment, for both public and 
private actors, could be pursued in many ways such as, stable and transparent political 
governance and judicial systems, along with a consistent and clearly defined regulatory regime. 
Large industrial projects must often be international, involving several Arctic states and even 
consumer countries. A framework to streamline such international collaboration would greatly 
facilitate investment (World Economic Forum 2014). 
 Implications from Opening of Arctic Sea Routes 
18 
 
3. Potential Impacts of Open Arctic Routes 
on the UK’s Maritime Interests  
The public perception of the Arctic is of extensive ice, unique species and cultures, and 
untouched pristine landscapes. While largely true, the Arctic is also home to some 4 million 
people and an annual economy of roughly $230bn (World Economic Forum 2014).   
Arctic economic growth is focused in four key sectors — mineral resources, fisheries, logistics, 
and Arctic tourism — all of which require shipping, and could generate investment reaching 
$100bn or more in the Arctic region over the next decade. The UK already has a leading role in 
Arctic science, and London has the world’s 20 largest active insurance and reinsurance 
companies (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013).  
3.1 Economic Impact Analysis  
Studies of the economic viability of Arctic shipping produce widely varying conclusions, and as 
far as the authors are aware there is no quantitative economic impact analysis regarding 
increased Arctic shipping specific to the UK’s interests. More general observations on the UK’s 
economic relationship with other Arctic states can be made however.   
The UK enjoys healthy trading links with the Arctic council member states. Half of the member 
states of the Arctic Council — the United States, Russia, Canada, and Sweden are also top 20 
trading partners for the UK. For example UK exports to Finland totalled £1.75bn in 2013, and 
the UK is the largest supplier of imported services and the 10th largest total supplier of imported 
goods to Iceland (Kochis 2015). Exports to Sweden were worth £5.6bn in 2013; in the same 
year, exports to Russia were worth £5.2bn and exports to Canada were worth £4.5bn (HMRC 
2015). Bilateral trade between the UK and Norway is worth £18bn per annum, and Norway 
supplies 30 per cent of the UK’s total energy (Prime Minister's Office 2011), and 55 per cent of 
UK gas imports (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013).  
In 2015 UK shipbuilder Cammell Laird was awarded the contract to build the new Arctic 
research ship ‘RRS Sir David Attenborough’ amid international competition. This single £200m 
project simultaneously secured 400 jobs, and the future of the UK as a world leader in polar 
research (BBC 2015). Cammell Laird is committed to investing in British companies like Rolls 
Royce for the build which is the biggest commercial shipbuilding contract in Britain and restores 
British ship-building capability for icy waters. 
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3.2 International Comparisons  
3.2.1 The UK 
The UK and London in particular is a world leader for maritime services, many of which need 
Arctic specific knowledge. The IMO is based in London and the UK also has Arctic operations 
experience with the British Antarctic Survey and the Royal Navy, and within industry like BP. 
The UK is able to offer businesses a ‘one-stop shop’ for maritime services because the City of 
London is home to a wealth of companies providing expertise across all sectors (Department for 
Transport 2017): (i) In insurance, the UK leads the world, with a 35% share of global marine 
insurance premiums, and 60% of P&I insurance. (ii) In broking, 26% of global shipbroking is 
undertaken in the UK, significantly more than any of its rivals and the UK has more than half the 
global share of tanker charter business and up to 40% of dry-bulk charters. (iii) English law is 
the global industry standard and the UK boasts unrivalled legal and judicial expertise on 
shipping, insurance and international trade matters with 25% of maritime legal partners 
practicing in the UK. (iv) London is home to the leading source of market information on the 
trading and settlement of physical and financial shipping derivatives in the Baltic Exchange, with 
the majority of the Exchange’s members based in London. The UK maritime sector directly 
contributes around £13.5bn to GDP and supports over 110,000 jobs.  
 
The UK ports industry is the largest in Europe 
and the scale of diversity of operations includes 
all-purpose facilities, container, bulk, ferry, and 
cruise terminals. Approximately 96% of the 
volume of all UK import/export trade enters the 
UK through its ports. In addition, some 32 million 
international passengers use UK ports every year 
while another 38 million use them for domestic 
journeys. The UK is the second to the US 
(18.1%) in worldwide earnings from services and 
income as a proportion of world exports with 
7.4%, compared with 19.2% for Europe, 7% 
Germany and 5.3% France (UKTI 2013). The 
House of Lords (2015) point to Aberdeen’s role 
as a centre of expertise for the oil and gas 
industry and add that northern and eastern UK 
ports might be well-placed to take advantage of 
the expansion of the NSR and eventually TSR 
traffic; the role, strategic location, and expertise of 
Scotland should therefore be highlighted in future 
policy (Bailes and MacDonald 2015). 
 
3.2.2 The Rest of the World 
Currently the main providers of Arctic shipping are entities that reside within the Arctic with 
Russia (e.g. Sovcomflot), Canada (e.g. Fednav), and the Scandinavian countries the biggest 
players. The Canadian and US ice breaking fleets are less than one sixth the size of the 
Russian fleet (Appendix 1). In 2015, the Russian government released their ‘Integrated 
Development Plan for the Northern Sea Route 2015 – 2030’. The plan stresses the importance 
of providing safer and more reliable navigation on the NSR for maritime export of Russian 
natural resources and the strategic importance of NSR for Russian national security. The plan is 
Figure 8. Location of the UK’s major ports, 
adapted from UKTI (2013). 
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also to increase international transit cargo transportation along the NSR in partnership with 
Asian countries and in particular with China (Gunnarsson 2016).  
Arctic shipping technology providers typically supply services globally; currently there are only a 
very small number of these specialist technology providers, most notably in Finland. Total, the 
French multinational oil and gas company is involved in the huge LNG project on the Yamal 
peninsula involving 15 icebreaking tankers built in South Korea and a $15bn investment from 
China. The European Union flagged fleet accounts for about 20% of the world’s shipping fleet; 
maritime freight transport is projected to grow at high rates in Europe; a European Commission 
sponsored report projects an inter-continental tonne-kilometre growth for the EU of 71% from 
2020 – 2050 (Petersen et al. 2009). 
In 2009 a German company made the first non-Russian commercial transit voyage on the NSR, 
from South Korea to Rotterdam, shaving 3,000 nautical miles off the Suez Canal route, and 
making estimated savings of $300,000 for each of the two vessels involved (Blunden 2012). In 
2009 22 per cent of German exports were destined for China, compared with just 9 per cent in 
2002 (Pålsson and Bengtsson 2008). German transport vessels supply western Siberia, and 
German shipyards are building more ships than ever before capable of navigating the northern 
routes (Blunden 2012). 
East Asia has a substantial impact on global trade and shipping underpins the Asian economic 
system. Both Japan and South Korea have a keen interest in the commercialisation of the NSR, 
but it is China that has most at stake. As the NSR becomes increasingly vital to supply China’s 
demand for raw materials from the Arctic, the Chinese are increasingly collaborating with the 
Russia and its state owned shipping company Sovcomflot. However this investment by China is 
not unique to the Arctic, China is investing heavily in port infrastructure in other regions too, and 
China’s international trade with Northern Europe is one of many inter-continental interests 
Humpert (2013).  
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3.3 Geopolitical Considerations  
The Arctic relies on collaboration across borders and in this respect is a model of how 
diplomacy can work in an area of mutual interest. Hyped disputes about activity on the sea floor 
are largely scientific in nature and claims of extensions to continental boundaries are dealt with 
through conventional U.N. channels as elsewhere in the world (World Economic Forum 2014).  
Increasing traffic sailing from the Arctic into the UK’s northern area of interest will raise 
questions about maritime domain awareness, and SAR in the waters north of the British Isles. 
Currently the UK Coastguard has responsibility in waters adjacent to the Arctic which could be 
affected by increased traffic. The Arctic states 
are cooperating closely on SAR but they lack 
resources. Noting these deficiencies, the 
House of Lords (2015) argue that the UK 
should shoulder its responsibility in this area 
and “give urgent attention to developing a 
pan-Arctic SAR strategy along with the Arctic 
states”. 
The re-commissioning of Arctic Cold War 
bases (Figure 9) is providing Russia with a 
huge geostrategic advantage in that it can 
move its naval fleet to Asia far faster and 
giving flexibility that Russian military planners 
rarely had before (Coffey 2015). This military 
infrastructure build-up has raised some 
concerns in other Arctic states given the wider 
geopolitical context, but is not generally 
viewed as a threat as Russia’s focus seems to 
be predominantly on regional security and in 
protecting its sea routes (Wilton Park 2016). 
These developments may however have 
implications for the security of the UK’s and 
NATO’s northern flank and concerns about the 
Royal Navy’s capability to respond (D 
Depledge 2017, personal communication, 26 
January).  
The industrial developments along the Yamal 
Peninsula (Figure 9, location 15) combined 
with re-commissioning Arctic military bases 
led to a 40% year-on-year increase in activity 
for Arctic ports in 2016 (Staalesen 2017) and 
could in future provide vital SAR cover and 
emergency portage required to expand the 
NSR.  
The UK is not currently in a position to 
compete with other Arctic states and Arctic 
Council observers (such as Norway, Russia, 
Korea and China) in terms of the financial and Figure 9. Russia's Arctic Bases (Wood 2016). 
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Table 2. Global Chokepoints  
Location Vessels 
per year 
Capacity Threat 
Strait of 
Hormuz 
50,000 Narrow  Regional 
Instability & 
Terrorism 
Suez 
Canal 
17,228 200k dwt, 
convoy limit 
Terrorism 
Bosporus 50,000 Ship size, 
200k dwt 
Controls 
Strait of 
Malacca 
60,000 300k dwt Terrorism & 
Piracy 
Panama 
Canal 
14,323 120k dwt  NA 
Strait Bab 
el-Mandeb 
22,000 Narrow  Terrorism & 
Piracy 
 
material resources that it can commit to the Arctic. The lack of state enterprises means that the 
decision to pursue economic opportunities rests with British-based businesses themselves 
(although they might work with government to alleviate political risks). In governance terms, the 
UK as an observer only has a limited role in the Arctic Council. Use of the UK’s polar logistics, 
including the new polar research vessel, will be prioritised in Antarctica, although the Research 
Council’s Arctic Office and Arctic Research Programme will continue to direct a small proportion 
of the UK’s polar resources to the Arctic. (Depledge 2014). 
Although Arctic routes have their 
challenges, the traditional trade routes have 
threats too (Table 2). The various 
chokepoints have limits for ship size and 
weight. Some of the regions passed through 
present security hazards with threats of 
terrorism and piracy. The 1956 Suez Crisis 
showed how quickly passage through the 
region could be halted by political instability; 
a repeat of these or similar events in the 
21st century would force shipping to use 
longer routes via the Cape of Good Hope 
and Panama Canal; and if conditions 
permit, the far shorter trans-Arctic routes 
which don’t suffer from the same security 
threats outlined in Table 2. 
3.4 Safety & Sustainability of Arctic Operations 
Increased shipping in the Arctic presents increased risks and will undoubtedly have indigenous 
social and environmental repercussions (IMarEST 2016). Impacts on the sensitive Arctic 
environment include: emissions of ‘black carbon’, risk of introducing invasive species, and 
chemical contamination, all of which can be mitigated by appropriate legislation. Risks to 
personnel include: inadequate SAR capability and dangers of operating in extreme conditions, 
although risks can be reduced with adequate training. Many of the mandatory legislations and 
voluntary guidelines are developed and supported with the aid of UK organisations.   
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Figure 10. An illustrative guide of the Polar Code to the protection of the environment designed 
by the IMO to raise awareness (Source: IMO). 
The UN IMO Polar Code, which came into operation 1 January 2017, is a key advance in 
guidelines for Arctic shipping and acts to supplement the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions 
which have been effective in protecting the environment whilst ensuring safe shipping in 
international waters. Led by Lloyd’s of London in conjunction with the Nordic Association of 
Marine Insurers, the International Union of Marine Insurance, and Lloyd’s Register, and with the 
close cooperation of the Arctic and Antarctic States, this has helped establish a single ice 
[navigation] regime system, to give guidance for a range of planned and possible situations that 
might emerge when operating a ship in Polar waters. Oil discharge in the Arctic remains a big 
issue, and whilst major operators follow best practice it is possible that rogue operators could 
bring the whole industry, into disrepute (IMarEST 2016). The IMO Polar Code advances 
environmental protection for Arctic waters by banning all discharge of waste. However there 
remain governance challenges in the implementation, awareness, enforcement, and 
coordination of these and other issues, which the UK could assist with. 
London based maritime organisations have led the development of significant international 
regulation for the protection of seafarers, the environment and the indigenous peoples of the 
Polar Regions. It is a demonstration of the maritime strength of the City of London and is an 
example of what industry, governments and international regulators can achieve by working 
together (M Kingston 2016, personal communication, December 2016). 
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Figure 11. An illustrative guide to the ship safety components of the Polar Code designed by the 
IMO to promote awareness (Source: IMO). 
3.5 Future Opportunities 
Future economic opportunities include capitalising on increasing Europe bound traffic through 
the North Sea. The prospects of an ice-free Arctic have led to Stornoway Port Authority 
proposing their long-term vision to become an Arctic gateway hub in 20 years, due to their 
strategic location for European bound trans-Arctic shipping (BBC 2013; Mcbeth 2013). In 2016, 
China’s COSCO shipping company (one of the world’s largest) sent five vessels through the 
NSR, one of which delivered wind power equipment to the UK, becoming the third voyage to the 
UK via the NSR (Humpert 2016). Awarding the contract for the new Arctic research ship to UK 
shipbuilder Cammell Laird (Section 3.1) ensures that the UK retains its future readiness to 
construct specialist ice-class vessels.  
For the UK to fully capitalise on the potential future increase in Arctic shipping we may need to 
consider cooperation with other countries with common interests. Lloyd's Register (2015) 
surmise that the most tangible benefits of increased shipping in the Arctic to the UK maritime 
industry are an increase in UK passenger cruise voyages, increased export of natural 
resources, and the use of the UK’s specialist maritime services. These interests are 
summarised in the following sections. 
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3.5.1 Passenger Cruise Voyages 
There may be direct economic and/or employment benefits to the UK from an increase in 
Passenger Cruise Voyages in the Arctic. Lloyd's Register (2015) envision these may arise from 
a combination of the following: 
  
1. UK registered cruise ships operating for Passenger Cruise Voyages in the Arctic  
2. UK ports of embarkation for International Passenger Cruise Voyages in the Arctic  
3. UK domiciled specialist tour and expedition cruise operators  
 
Considering the relatively substantial UK & Ireland global market share, and the global 
prominence of UK embarkation ports like Southampton, it could be anticipated that increased 
numbers of UK & Ireland citizens will travel to the Arctic for Passenger Cruise Voyages. 
Furthermore it is feasible that international customers may travel with UK operators on UK ships 
from UK ports to the Arctic as northern UK ports are closer in voyage distance to Arctic cruising 
destinations than most other popular European ports of embarkation.  
 
3.5.2 Export of Natural Resources  
Direct economic and/or employment benefits to the UK from increased export of natural 
resources from the Arctic (Table 3) could be anticipated in the case of one or a combination of 
the following Lloyd's Register (2015) scenarios:  
 
1. UK import of natural resource cargoes from the Arctic  
2. UK registered commercial ships employed to load natural resources from ports in the Arctic 
for export  
3. UK port trans-shipment of natural resource cargoes from the Arctic  
 
In the first scenario there is a possibility that UK buyers of natural resources from Arctic projects 
could be responsible for the provision of specialist Arctic shipping. Such a scenario is quite 
common for LNG cargoes where long term agreements (typically with an international oil 
company) for the purchase of large volumes of LNG cargo are essential to justify huge 
investments in infrastructure.  
The second scenario could be envisaged where Arctic minerals are imported to the UK on 
dedicated, purpose designed and built, Arctic specification commercial ships (albeit highly 
dependent on attractive commercially terms for any minerals imported from the Arctic)  
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Table 3. Currently operational/planned Arctic natural resource projects, their country, resource, 
date of operation, shipping season, and shipping vessel type and quantity. Adapted from Lloyd's 
Register (2015), project location map bottom. *Estimate 
Area Project Resource Date Shipping season 
Shipping 
demand 
Canada 
Polaris, (Little 
Cornwallis Island) Zinc 1971 – 2002 3 months 
1 icebreaking 
bulk carrier 
Raglan, (Deception 
Bay) Nickel 
1997 – 
present 8 months 
1 icebreaking 
bulk carrier 
Baffinland, (Milne Inlet) Iron Ore 2015 – present Year-round 
3 ice class bulk 
carriers* 
Baffinland, (Steensby 
Port) Iron Ore 2020* Unknown  
10-17 
icebreaking ore 
carriers* 
US Red Dog (Alaska) Zinc  1987 – 
current 
July – October 23 ship calls/year 
Russia 
Norilsk Nickel Mine 
(Dudinka Port on 
Yensei River) 
Nickel 1930s – Current 
Year-round 
since 2005 
5 icebreaking 
container ships 
Prirazlomnoye 
(Pechora Sea) Oil 
2014 – 
current Year-round 
2 icebreaking oil 
tankers 
Varandey (Pechora 
Sea) Oil 
2008 – 
current Year-round 
3 icebreaking oil 
tankers 
Yamal LNG (Sabetta 
Port, Ob River) 
Natural 
Gas 
2016 – 
current 
Year-round 
12-16 
icebreaking LNG 
carriers* 
Noviy Port (Ob bay) Oil 2014 – current 
Year-round 
since 2016 
6 icebreaking oil 
tankers 
Dashed lines represent seasonal export; yellow future projects 
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In the third scenario a UK port is 
developed for trans-shipment of 
natural resource cargoes from the 
Arctic, with direct economic and/or 
employment benefits to the UK. For 
example the Yamal LNG project 
reached an agreement in April 
2014 for a Belgian LNG receiving 
terminal at Zeebrugge to act as a 
winter season LNG trans-shipment 
exchange port between Arctic 
specialised and conventional LNG 
carriers (Figure 12). This is a joint 
venture with China with a capital 
expenditure of $2.1bn, scheduled 
to deliver by 2018 – 2020 with LNG 
contracts sold through to 2045, and 
a requirement for 15 icebreaking 
LNG carriers and 15 conventional 
trans-shipment LNG carriers. The 
UK has the capacity to emulate 
projects like this this with the 
largest LNG terminal in Europe on 
the Isle of Grain in Kent, with the 
capacity to receive, reload, and 
process 15 million tonnes of LNG a year, equivalent to 20% of the UK gas demand (UKTI 
2013). 
3.5.3 Specialist UK Maritime Service Providers 
The UK will likely continue to benefit from Arctic shipping through the provision of services and 
specialist equipment based in the UK to global entities involved in Arctic shipping. This may 
include, but is not restricted to:  
1. Specialist ship management services  
2. Insurance and underwriting service provision, such as, for example specialist insurance for 
operations in Arctic seas provided by London based underwriters  
3. Technical services providers, such as, for example Classification and Certification services 
from Lloyd’s Register  
4. Specialist suppliers of equipment and materials 
 
For many of these maritime services the UK and London is world leading. This highly skilled 
sector should continue to flourish if the commercial regulatory environment permits and London 
remains an attractive global hub. 
 
3.6 Arctic Data Requirements for Informed Policy Decisions  
Recent environmental changes in the Arctic are so pronounced that they have been identified 
despite incomplete and uncoordinated observing capabilities. The lack of adequate and 
coordinated pan-Arctic observations currently limits society’s capability to identify, respond and 
Figure 12. Yamal LNG export routes. Source: TeeKay LNG 
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predict the geographic extent and severity of ongoing changes. A robust Arctic observation 
network is needed to address these limitations; such a network would be founded on existing 
platforms and observatories, starting with a set of key variables that are already measured at 
many locations but are not often collated (National Research Council 2006).  
Better Arctic observations are also required for safe tactical operations in the Arctic Ocean in 
addition to both scientific, and commercial strategic progress. The Government Response to the 
House of Lords (2015) Select Committee Report highlighted the importance of continued 
investment into climate modelling centres like the UK Met Office, and science programs, like 
those coordinated by NERC’s Arctic Office, to enable this enhanced understanding to provide 
better predictions of the future Arctic.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This report outlines the past and future changes to Arctic sea ice and the opportunities that this 
may afford local and global shipping, trade and industry, and government alike. The findings are 
summarised below along with the pertinent implications for policy makers. 
4.1 Increased Navigability 
4.1.1 Summary  
 Currently the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and North West Passage (NWP) are seasonally 
open most years with minor ice-breaking support, with the Trans-Arctic shipping season 
peaking in late summer. However in the first half of 21st century the shipping season on the 
NSR and NWP will remain variable and unreliable, continuing to require ice-classed vessels 
or ice-breaker escort during summer months. 
 Increasing global and Arctic temperatures will continue to open Arctic routes more frequently 
and increase the Arctic shipping season length. Conditions on the NSR are easiest, with 
conditions on the NWP becoming similar about a decade later. The trans-polar route (TSR) 
across the central Arctic Ocean should become available around mid-century. Voyages from 
UK to East Asia typically save 10-12 days using a trans-Arctic route compared to the Suez 
Canal route.   
 By mid-century for a greenhouse gas emissions mitigation scenario in line with the recent 
UN ‘Paris’ climate change agreements, the number of navigable days per season is 2.5 
times greater than early-century; for ‘business as usual’ greenhouse gas emissions scenario 
it is 3.5 times greater.  
4.1.2 Implications 
If anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations can be reduced sharply in-line with the UN 
Paris climate change agreements Arctic ice melt and shipping opportunities will still continue to 
increase for the majority of the 21st century. However, even with continually increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations, climate models suggest there will always be some Arctic sea 
ice during winters through the 21st century. Although the Arctic shipping season length and 
reliability is likely to increase dramatically, for the vast majority of the current global shipping 
fleet sailing trans-Arctic will remain a seasonal endeavour. Based on the current activity and 
physical climate changes this suggests that trans-Arctic shipping is likely to increase, focused 
on the NSR, however, it is likely remain a niche market for specialist operators.  
4.2 Commercial Viability 
4.2.1 Summary 
 Incentives for trans-Arctic shipping: perceived economic savings from shorter global routes, 
destination for resource extraction and tourism.  
Challenges: risks from a challenging environment, remoteness, lack of crew training.  
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 Academic literature on the economic viability of trans-Arctic shipping draw mixed 
conclusions, although most find it plausibly profitable. Trans-Arctic routes are unlikely to be 
economically viable for container traffic due to lack of en route ports providing networked 
economic opportunities. However, bulk shipping (unpackaged hold cargo e.g.  ore, LNG, oil) 
can take advantage of the shorter routes trans-Arctic routes offer due to more flexible 
schedules compared to container shipping.  
 The Russian government wishes to develop the NSR as a commercial enterprise, and 
although they charge fees for its use they do offer substantial services such as ice breaking 
support and pilotage. These are likely to remain necessary for the shoulder seasons and for 
future investment and development of the route.  
4.2.2 Implications 
Arctic routes will not replace traditional canal routes (Suez and Panama) in the 21st Century, 
although they will likely be used for an increasing Arctic bulk and destination shipping market 
and may provide a seasonal supplement for non-Arctic specialists. Current commercial viability 
is focused on destination shipping, largely suppling increasing natural resource projects. The 
NSR will remain the most commercially popular area due to favourable sea ice conditions, 
population and industry centres, and the proactivity of the Russian government in 
commercialising the route. Although tariffs for the use of the NSR are currently high, the 
management of the route is necessary for safety and productivity in the coming decades. It 
remains to be seen what impact the opening of the central Arctic TSR around mid-century will 
have on the NSR for trans-Arctic shipping, although destination shipping will certainly still centre 
on the NSR.  
4.3 Considerations for the U.K.  
4.3.1 Summary 
 The UK, has a leading role in Arctic science, and London is the global centre for maritime 
services. Half of the member states of the Arctic Council are also top 20 trading partners for 
the UK. 
 The main provider of Arctic shipping is Russia, with Canada and the Scandinavian countries 
also having extensive expertise. Northern European industry and ports in the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Belgium are also increasingly being involved in projects requiring Arctic 
shipping. 
 Arctic economic growth is focused in four key sectors — mineral resources, fisheries, 
logistics, and tourism — all of which require shipping, and could generate investment 
reaching $100bn or more in the Arctic region over the next decade. The UK enjoys a 
substantial global market share of cruise tourism, which presents realistic economic 
opportunities for the development of UK based Arctic cruise tourism. The UK’s geographic 
location also makes it well placed for a trans-shipment port — transferring goods from Arctic 
ice-classed vessels to more southerly destinations on conventional carriers.  
 The UK will likely continue to benefit from Arctic shipping through the provision of services 
and specialist equipment based in the UK to global entities involved in Arctic shipping. For 
many of these maritime services the UK and London is world leading. This highly skilled 
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sector should continue to flourish if the commercial regulatory environment and London 
remains an attractive global hub. 
 The Russian military Arctic build-up may be good for infrastructure development along the 
NSR in the short term but has implications for the security of the UK’s and NATO’s northern 
flank.  
4.3.2 Implications 
An increase in Arctic shipping presents many economic opportunities for the UK from increased 
use of London based specialist services providers, Arctic cargoes, and cruise tourism. The UK 
is a world leader in Arctic science research, and continued investment would help the UK both 
directly and indirectly. The UK has considerable diplomatic influence through governance and 
commerce which could create strategic links to likeminded northern European nations and 
enhance the implementation and awareness, of marine conventions especially relevant for 
Arctic shipping such as, UNCLOS, SOLAS, MARPOL, and the Polar Code. The UK should 
capitalise on its extensive maritime expertise in fields such as science, technology, insurance, 
finance, legal, and regulatory, in order to maximise British influence and sustainable 
development of the Arctic.  
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Appendix 1. Major Icebreakers of the world 
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